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Direct income transfers and wage employment programmes are two specific instruments 
available for the redress of poverty. Two issues which are central to an assessment of 
these anti-poverty interventions are: (a) what is an optimal transfer/wage schedule? and 
(b) once the target population and the level of benefits to each member of the target 
population have been determined, how (informationally) demanding is it to ensure that 
the benefits reach only the target population? The answer to the first question would 
depend on precisely how one chooses to measure poverty, and the answer to the second 
question would depend on such properties of ‘self-selection’ as alternative forms of 
intervention may possess. Either or both sorts of questions have been addressed 
analytically by, among others, Basu (1981, 1991), Bourguignon and Fields (1990), 
Ravallion (2001, 1990), and Gangopadhyay and Subramanian (1992). In this note, the 
issues outlined above are investigated further. The results reported here on optimal anti-
poverty rules are mainly known results which draw considerably on the papers cited 
above, but they have nevertheless been dealt with for two reasons: (a) these results are 
an integral part of the paper; and (b) it may be independently useful to have a quick 
review of the relevant results, all in one place. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with preliminary formalities of 
poverty measurement. Section 3 reviews optimal anti-poverty policy, corresponding to 
different members of the Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) Pα  family of poverty 
measures, for both transfer and employment programmes, under conditions of presumed 
complete knowledge regarding the personal distribution of incomes. Section 4 compares 
the cost effectiveness of transfer and employment programmes under assumptions of 
full and partial knowledge of the income distribution curve. In section 5, Basu’s (1991) 
arguments in favour of a ‘low’ wage in wage employment programmes are reviewed 
from both normative and informational perspectives. Section 6 advances the cause of a 
modified wage employment programme as a form of disguised transfer payment to the 
poor which promotes investment in human capital. Section 7 concludes. 
2  Poverty measures: a quick review  
We begin with some preliminary formalities: x is a random variable signifying income 
and is distributed over the interval [0,m] ≡  U. F(x) is the cumulative density function of 
x. The poverty line z is a positive level of income such that units with income less than z 
are declared to be poor. The interval [0,z) will be designated Z. A poverty index P is a 
function which measures the extent of poverty by assigning a real number to every pair 
of cumulative distribution function F(x) defined on U, and poverty line z, in its domain. 
A class of poverty indices which has been much used in the literature, and is particularly 
helpful in facilitating policy analysis, is the so-called Pα  class of measures, due to 
Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984), and which can be written as 
(1) Pα  = ∫Z[(z-x)/z]
α dF(x) 
As is well known, for α  = 0, the index Pα   becomes just the headcount ratio (or 
proportion of the population in poverty) F(z); for α  = 1, Pα   becomes the per capita 
income-gap ratio R, which is the product of the headcount ratio H and the income-gap 
ratio I, where the latter is the proportionate shortfall of the average income of the poor 2 
 
µ
P from the poverty line (I = (1 – µ
P/z)); for α  = 2, Pα   becomes the distributionally 
sensitive index H[I





P is the squared coefficient of variation in 
the distribution of poor incomes; and, as α  increases, Pα   becomes more and more 
distributionally sensitive until, in the limit, as α  →  ∞ , we obtain a sort of ‘Rawlsian’ 
measure which ranks distributions solely according to the size of the lowest income.  
A poverty index P will be said to satisfy the monotonicity axiom if, given a poverty  
line z, P is greater for the distribution F(x) than for the distribution G(x) whenever  
F(x) ≥  G(x) ∀ x∈ U and F(x) > G(x) for some x∈ Z. The index P will be said to satisfy 
the transfer axiom if, given a poverty line z, P is greater for the distribution F(x) than 
for the distribution G(x) whenever ∫0
x[F(s) – G(s)]ds ≥  0 ∀ x∈ U, F(x) – G(x) > 0 for 
some x∈ Z, and ∫U[F(x)  –  G(x)]dx = 0, that is, whenever G(.) is derived from F(.) 
through a sequence of mean-preserving progressive transfers of which some benefit the 
poor (see Shorrocks and Subramanian 1994). The indices in the Pα  family satisfy the 
monotonicity axiom for all α  > 0, and the transfer axiom for all α  > 1. These properties 
play a crucial role in determining optimal anti-poverty allocations: this will become 
evident from a consideration of budgetary rules designed to minimize poverty as 
measured by different members of the Pα  family of indices. 
3 The  Pα  indices and optimal anti-poverty policy: another quick review 
3.1 Direct  income  transfers 
We consider first the case of direct income transfers. The budget available for transfers 
is designated by B, and it is assumed that the budget is not large enough to raise the 
entire population in poverty out of it, viz. B < ∫Z(z – x)dF(x).  The  policymaker’s 
problem is to select a schedule of transfers <t(x)> which will minimize the chosen 
poverty measure in the Pα   family, subject to the requirements (a) that the sum of 
transfers will not exceed the budgetary outlay, (b) that no transfer will exceed the 
poverty gap, and (c) that the poor will not be taxed. Formally, the optimization 
problem—which will be called problem 1—can be written as follows: 
Problem 1 
Minimize Pα  = ∫Z[(z – x – t(x))/z]
α dF(x) 
<t(x)> 
subject to: (a) ∫Zt(x)dF(x) ≤  B; (b) t(x) ≤  z – x ∀ x∈ Z; and (c) t(x) ≥  0 ∀ x∈ Z 
The solutions (i.e. optimal transfer schedules <t*(x)>) to this problem, for distinguished 
values of α , are provided below (see Bourguignon and Fields 1990, and Gangopadhyay 
and Subramanian 1992, for elaboration). 
α  = 0 
t*(x) = z – x ∀ x∈ T*, where T* ≡  [x0,z) and ∫T*(z – x)dF(x) = B 
        = 0 ∀ x∈ Z\T* 
α  = 1 3 
 
Any feasible transfer schedule <t(x)> which exhausts the budget is also optimal. 
α  > 1 
t*(x) = x* – x ∀ x∈ T**, where T** ≡  [0,x*) and ∫T**(x* – x)dF(x) = B; 
        = 0 ∀ x∈ Z\T**. 
When α  = 0, minimization of the headcount index requires allocating the entire budget 
to the richest of the poor: the poverty gaps of the richest are bridged till the budget is 
exhausted. When α  = 1, minimization of the per capita income-gap index admits an 
infinite number of solutions, and this is scarcely a useful guide to policy. When α  > 1, 
minimization of a distributionally sensitive index requires allocating the entire budget to 
the poorest of the poor: the incomes of the poorest are all raised to the highest level 
x* (< z) which is compatible with the size of the budget—this is a sort of ‘lexicographic 
maximin’ solution. 
3.2  Wage employment programmes  
We consider next the case of wage employment programmes. The relevant constrained 
optimization problem here will be called problem 2, which can be written, in analogy 
with problem 1, as follows (notice, first, that <w(x)> is a wage schedule; second, that it 
is assumed nobody will participate in the wage programme if their income x is at least 
as much as the wage on offer w(x); and third, that the budget is not large enough to 
ensure that poverty can be eradicated through the programme, viz. B < zF(z). 
Problem 2 
Minimize Pα  = ∫Z[(z – max{x,w})/z]
α dF(x) 
<w(x)> 
subject to: (a) ∫Zw(x)dF(x) ≤  B; (b) w(x) ≤  z ∀ x∈ Z; and (c) w(x) ≥  0 ∀ x∈ Z. 
As earlier, we consider the optimal solutions to this problem for different members of 
the Pα   family of poverty measures. (A more elaborate account can be found in 
Gangopadhyay and Subramanian 1992.) 
α  = 0 
w*(x) = z ∀ x∈ T, ∀ T⊂  Z: ∫TzdF(x) = B 
α  = 1 
w*(x) = z ∀ x∈ T1, where T1
 ≡  [0,x1) and zF(x1) = B 
α  = 2 
w*(x) = w2 (< z) ∀ x∈ T2, where T2
 ≡  [0,x2) and w2F(x2) = B 
α  →  ∞  
w*(x) = w∞  ∀ x∈ T
∞ , where T
∞  ≡  [0,w∞ ) and w∞ F(w∞ ) = B 4 
 
For both α  = 0 and α  = 1, the optimal wage is pitched at the high level of the poverty 
line income z; while the target population in the first case can be any subset of the poor 
population, in the second case, the target population (T1) is confined to the poorest 
F(x1) proportion of the population. For α  = 2, the wage is pitched lower, at w2, and this 
enables a larger target population (T2), consisting of the poorest F(x2) proportion, to 
participate in the wage employment programme. Indeed, as α  increases (that is, the 
poverty measure becomes more distributionally sensitive), the optimal wage declines 
and coverage increases, until, in the limit, as α  →  ∞ , the wage is pitched as low ( i.e. at 
w∞ ) as is compatible with everybody, who is willing to work at the wage on offer, being 
able to participate, which in this case is the poorest F(w∞ ) proportion of the population. 
Basu (1991) has a helpful diagrammatic representation of what, essentially, is the 
solution for the Pα   →   ∞  case, and his approach can be employed to illustrate also the 
solutions for the other cases we have considered. In Figure 1, we represent the wage rate 
on the horizontal axis and the amount of labour on the vertical axis (this inverts the axes 
as Basu draws them), and two curves are plotted. The first is a rectangular hyperbola 





indicates, for any wage rate w, the maximum labour M(w) that can be employed, 
namely B/w. The second curve is the labour supply curve, which is just the cumulative 
density function F(w). Basu recommends that the wage rate should be chosen in such a 
way that the number of persons willing to work at this wage coincides exactly with the 5 
 
maximum labour—given that the budget is B—which can be hired at this wage. The 
wage in question is clearly determined by the point of intersection of the two curves, 
and is, precisely, what we have earlier called w∞ —the solution to the Pα   →   ∞ —
minimization problem—corresponding to which the employment coverage is the 
poorest F(w∞ ) proportion of the population (see Figure 1). Similarly, if we wish to 
minimize the index P1, the wage rate should be fixed at the poverty line level of income 
z, and the employment coverage should be targeted at the poorest F(x1) proportion of 
the population, while if it is P2 that is sought to be minimized, the optimal wage is w2 
and the targeted coverage is the poorest F(x2) proportion of the population. As can be 
easily seen from Figure 1, as the poverty measure which is minimized changes from P1 
to P2 … to Pα  →  ∞ , the optimum wage declines from z to w2 … to w∞ , at the same time 
that the targeted coverage increases from the poorest F(x1) proportion of the population 
to the poorest F(x2) proportion … to the poorest F(w∞ ) proportion. 
3.3  A simple illustration 
To illustrate the results presented in section 3.2, we employ a simple numerical   
example wherein the cumulative density function is specialized to the linear form   
F(x) = x/m ∀ x∈ U, m is taken to be 20, z is taken to be 10, and B is taken to be 1. The 
level of benefits and the target population, for each type of intervention (direct transfers 
and employment programmes), and for parametric variation of α  in the Pα  family of 
poverty indices, are specified below. 
Direct income transfers 
α  = 0 
The target population is the interval T* ≡  [8.94,10); the optimal transfer is   
(10 – x)  ∀ x∈  T*; and the beneficiaries are the richest 10.6 per cent of the poor 
population, while the poorest 89.4 per cent are excluded. 
α  = 1 
Any budget-exhausting feasible transfer schedule is also optimal. 
α  > 1 
The target population is the interval T** ≡  [0,6.32); the optimal transfer is   
(6.32 – x) ∀ x∈  T**; and the beneficiaries are the poorest 63.25 per cent of the poor 
population, while the richest 36.75 per cent are excluded. 6 
 
Wage employment programme 
α  = 0 
The optimum wage is z (= 10), and the target population is any 20 per cent of the poor 
population. 
α  = 1 
The optimum wage is again z (= 10); the target population is the interval T1
 ≡  [0,2); and 
the beneficiaries are the poorest 20 per cent of the poor population.  
α  = 2 
It may be instructive to actually work through the solution to the problem. With a wage 
schedule of <w(x)>, the value of the poverty index P2 is given by: 
P2 = ∫Z[(z – max{x,w(x)})/z]
2. 
At the optimum, let T2
 be the target population. It is clear that ∀ x∈ T2: w(x) = w (say). 
For suppose not. Then ∃  x,x′∈ T2: w(x) > w(x′) or w(x) < w(x′)—which, however, 
cannot be an optimal outcome since, because P2 satisfies the transfer axiom, equalizing 
w(x) and w(x′) will reduce poverty. Further, again since P2 is transfer-preferring, the 
target population must be the poorest of the poor, namely T2 = [0,x2) where x2, out of 
deference to the budget constraint, must satisfy F(x2) = B/w. Given this, the problem 
becomes one of choosing w so as to minimize 
P2 = ∫ T2[(z – w)/z]
2dF(x) + ∫ Z\T2[(z – x)/z]
2dF(x) 
Recalling that F(x) = x/m ∀ x∈ U, m = 20, z = 10,  B = 1, and F(x2) = B/w, some simple 
manipulation will show that the problem reduces to choosing w so as to minimize  
P2 = (373/300) + (w/100) + (2/w
2) – (4/3w
3). 
The first order condition for a minimum (∂ P2/∂ w = 0) yields an optimal wage rate—call 
it w2—of 7. (It can be verified that the second order condition is also satisfied.) Since 
F(x2) = B/w, one obtains (after plugging in the relevant values): x2 = 2.86, and   
F(x2) = 0.1429 (or, since F(z) = 0.5, F(x2)/F(z) = 0.2857). To summarize: 
When  α  = 2, the optimum wage w2 is 7; the target population is the interval 
T2
  ≡  [0,2.86); and the beneficiaries are the poorest 28.57 per cent of the poor 
population. 
α  →  ∞  
The optimum wage w∞  is 4.47; the target population is the interval T
∞  ≡  [0,4.47); and 
the beneficiaries are the poorest 44.72 per cent of the poor population. 
Table 1 conveniently summarizes all these results. 7 
 









Optimal transfer schedule 
Coverage (% of 
poor population that 
benefit) 
1  Direct income transfer  
 P 0 T*  =  [8.94,10]  t*(x) =  10-x ∀ x∈  T*; 
 =  0  ∀ x∉ T*. 
10.6 
 P 1  Variable  Any feasible schedule which 
exhausts the budget 
Variable 
 P α >1  T** = [0,6.32]  t*(x) = 6.32-x ∀ x∈  T**; 











Coverage (% of 
poor population that 
benefit) 
2  Wage employment programme    
 P 0  Any 20% of poor population  z (=10)  20 
 P 1  T1 = [0,2]  z (=10)  20 
 P 2 T2
 = [0,2.86]  7  28.57 
 P α→∞  T ∞  = [0,4.47]  4.47  44.72 
 
4  Direct income transfers and wage employment programmes: a comparison 
In comparing the cost effectiveness of the two modes of anti-poverty intervention we 
have considered, we can either compare the post-intervention values of the poverty 
index for a given budgetary outlay, or the budgetary outlays required to secure a given 
post-intervention value of the poverty index (see Ravallion 2001 [1990]). In the context 
of the simple numerical example worked out in section 3.3, it can be verified that if, for 
specificity, we choose to minimize the Pα   →   ∞  index, then, for a budgetary outlay of 
B = 1, the value of the poverty index in the direct transfers (respectively, employment 
programme) case is 0.0511 (respectively, 0.0965). Alternatively, if the post-intervention 
target value of the poverty index is 0.0965, then this target—it can be checked—can be 
achieved in the direct transfers (respectively, employment programme) case with a 
budgetary outlay of 0.5 (respectively, 1.0). Direct transfers are clearly more cost 
effective than employment programmes—under the assumption of perfect knowledge 
regarding the personal distribution of incomes. If, however, the policymaker only has 
knowledge of the shape of the cumulative density function F(x), without knowledge of 
who has what income, then that would suffice to implement the optimal wage schedule, 
but not the optimal transfer schedule. To achieve perfect targeting of income transfers to 
the intended beneficiaries would require investment in collecting the necessary data on 
who has what income. Let the cost of collecting such data (assuming this is feasible at 
all) be c. Let b be the difference in budgetary outlays needed under the two schemes to 
secure a given post-intervention target value of the poverty index (in the numerical 
example just considered, where the objective was to reduce Pα  →  ∞  to a value of 0.0965, 
b = 1.0 – 0.5 = 0.5). One could say that transfers are more effective than employment 
schemes if c < b, and the other way around if c > b (see Gangopadhyay and 
Subramanian 1992). 8 
 
But how do we compare alternative wage allocation strategies within the overall 
employment approach to poverty redress? Some elements of this problem are discussed 
in the following section. 
5  Employment programmes and alternative wage patterns 
5.1  On an ‘ethical’ wage 
Basu (1981, 1991) was among the first to explicitly address the question of what 
constitutes an ‘ethical’ wage in wage employment programmes. Responding to 
criticisms (for example Dandekar and Sathe 1980) that wages were often set very low in 
public employment programmes, Basu argues that from both intrinsic (ethical) and 
instrumental (‘self-selection’) points of view, there is a case for keeping wages low in a 
specific sense. This ‘specific sense’ is constituted by what we have called the w∞  wage 
rate, whose derivation Basu explains in terms of the diagrammatic representation of 
Figure 1 (reviewed in section 3.2). Basu’s ethical argument for setting the wage at w∞  is 
best expressed in his own words (Basu 1991: 366-7): 
[Dandekar and Sathe 1980] found that 90 per cent of the people working 
on [the Employment Guarantee Scheme in Maharashtra] continue to be 
below the poverty line despite such work. From this they went on to 
conclude that wages should be raised. In the case of Bangladesh, Ahmed 
and Hussain (1985: 80) observed that wages paid to FFW [Food For 
Work] workers were substantially below the officially stipulated wage 
rate. ‘It has been shown that about 56 per cent of the workers did not 
know about the stipulated wage rate. Those who know do not bargain 
lest they do not get the jobs at all as there are many others who are 
unemployed and would be too willing to take them up on the offered 
terms and conditions’(my [Basu’s] italics). It is the italicized part which 
suggests why underpayment need not be unethical, since that will make it 
possible to employ a large number of people who are needy enough to be 
willing to work for a low wage. 
Suppose we subscribe to a headcount view of poverty and try to 
minimize this. Then, given a total stock of foodgrain X, which is to be 
disbursed through the FFW, we would try to heap it on people so as to 
ensure that the maximum number of people cross the poverty line. But 
clearly our more intuitive normative penchant (as opposed to one 
formally derived from trying to minimize the headcount index) would be 
to spread out X over the poorest people, even if that leaves the numbers 
on the two sides of the poverty line the same. Fortunately, according to 
some more sophisticated measures, this will register a decline in 
poverty…. [w∞ ], it is being argued here, is the wage that we should aim 
to offer…. [T]here are three ways of raising the wage: 
i)  By improving the opportunities open to labourers (by, for 
example, having infrastructural investments in the rural sector). 
This would [lower] the supply curve in [Figure 1].  9 
 
ii)  By assigning a larger food stock for distribution through FFW. 
This raises the ‘potential employment’ curve.  
iii)  By simply deciding to set [w] above [w∞ ] and maintaining an 
excess supply of labour. What I have argued above is that we 
should raise wages via methods (i) and (ii); option (iii) ought not 
to be normally used. 
In assessing Basu’s argument, one can readily see his case against pitching the wage 
rate at z, if that stratagem is dictated entirely by some primary, non-contingent value (of 
the type called basic by Sen 1967) which upholds the desirability of minimizing the 
headcount ratio: this poverty index, which fails both the monotonicity and transfer 
axioms, has little in the way of ethical appeal to (unconditionally) commend it. But why 
must a rejection of P0 on ethical grounds entail an endorsement only, and at the polar 
extreme, of Pα   →   ∞ ,  the sole member of the Pα  family of poverty measures whose 
minimization is compatible with an optimal wage of w∞ ? The answer is self-evident if 
the ethical content of the wage-setting exercise is driven solely by considerations of 
equitableness. For then, in as much as the distribution-sensitivity of Pα  is an increasing 
function of α , one must necessarily go all the way down to indefinitely large values of α  
in order to be maximally ‘equity-conscious’ (and therefore, interchangeably, ‘ethical’). 
But assigning lexical priority to equity over all other considerations may not, for good 
reason, be a widely-held basic value: there are rational moralities which entertain 
tradeoffs between equity and other values (such as efficiency), and which resist an 
unconditional insistence on various forms of ‘positional dictatorship’. Indeed, it has 
often been held that the ‘extreme’ egalitarianism upheld by ‘Rawls-type’ formulations 
(of which the measure Pα   →   ∞  is an example) is an endorsement of a somewhat 
unattractive form of ‘dictatorship of the weakest/poorest’. 
It is not exceptionable, therefore, to fail to see that maximizing coverage is the only 
valid objective of an anti-poverty employment programme: there may be a genuine 
ethical case for effecting a tradeoff between coverage, on the one hand and, on the 
other, the individual-specific level of benefit which is delivered by the programme. The 
point may be exemplified by means of an analogy (while guarding against a 
literal-minded interpretation of the parallels sought to be established). Suppose it takes 
Rs 10 to acquire one square meal, and that a ten-rupee note is available for charity. 
There are, let us say, six potential beneficiaries to consider, of whom one can already 
afford one square meal and the remaining five have completely empty pockets. The 
ability to have command over two square meals, it will be assumed, will constitute the 
ability to escape ‘poverty’. Suppose the choice of allocations is restricted to a set of 
three options {A, B, C}. In option A, the richest of the six poor individuals is given the 
ten-rupee note, which will reduce the (aggregate) headcount index of poverty from six 
to five. In option B, one of the five completely destitute individuals is given the ten-
rupee note, in which case the headcount index will remain unaltered but poverty, 
according to ‘some more sophisticated poverty measures’, will register a decline. In 
option C, each of the five destitutes is given Rs  2, which again will not affect the 
headcount calculus but will be endorsed by a ‘Rawls-type’ poverty index. It is 
conceivable that two equity-conscious individuals may be united in resisting option A 
without necessarily agreeing about the ranking of options B and C. There is a certain 
resonance with the ‘life-boat ethics’ dilemma here. It could well be held that enabling 
just one of the five destitutes to acquire at least one square meal (option B) might be 10 
 
‘ethically superior’ to leaving all five of them better off than initially but still in fairly 
impaired circumstances with Rs 2 each (option C). 
The tradeoff between the coverage of an unemployment scheme and the wage that is 
offered has similarities to the problem exemplified by the above illustration. The very 
fact of entertaining reasonable grounds for effecting a tradeoff has two general 
implications which may be worth emphasizing. The first is that it may be factually 
mistaken to credit the planner or evaluator with a conscious and deliberate choice of 
poverty index whose minimization then leads to her/his wage-setting recommendation. 
The second is that it may be normatively mistaken to infer an unconditional preference 
over alternative poverty indices on the planner’s or evaluator’s part on the basis of 
her/his wage-setting recommendation. These issues are elaborated in what follows. 
First, the ‘factual mistake’. Let T be the target population of an employment 
programme, and w the wage rate compatible with the coverage implied by T. In 
practice, one might be expected to have a more direct and immediate judgement of the 
relative attractiveness of alternative combinations of (T,w) than of the relative 
attractiveness of alternative values of an exponential parameter (α ) in a poverty index. 
Typically, that is, one would—taking all ‘relevant considerations’ into account—favour 
some particular combination of (T,w), say (T*,w*). It is true, of course, that one can 
infer the value of α —call it α *—such that a minimization of Pα * will yield (T*,w*) as 
the optimal solution to the wage-setting problem. The factual point to note is that it is 
not a deliberate choice of α * and the minimization of Pα * which has resulted in the 
recommendation of (T*,w*), but that the latter choice is prior (and compatible with, 
though not caused by, the minimization of Pα *). This is saying no more than what is 
contained in Basu’s statement attributing a greater immediacy to ‘our more intuitive 
normative penchant [than to] one formally derived from trying to minimize [a poverty] 
index…’. (Only, and as we have seen earlier, it is conceivable that one’s ‘normative 
penchant’ could lead to a recommendation of (T*,w*) which is different from Basu’s 
prescription of (T
∞ ,w∞ ).) 
Second, the ‘normative mistake’. This has to do with the possibility that a criticism of a 
‘low’ wage in a public employment programme may well be an indirect criticism of the 
smallness of the budgetary outlay B and/or the height of the cumulative density function 
F(.). Specifically, while w∞  is always the lowest budget-exhausting wage that can be set 
in relation to the size of B and given the F(.) function, unhappiness with the lowness of 
w∞  may stem from an absolute rather than relative perspective. If w∞  is seen to be an 
absolutely low wage, then, to endorse w∞  after ‘normalizing’ for B and F(.) might be to 
endorse (a) poor macroeconomic management in the dimensions of growth and 
distribution (as reflected in F(.)) and/or (b) low budgetary allocations (as reflected in the 
size of B) arising, possibly, from fiscal profligacy or excessive defence spending or 
poor revenue collection. Going back to Figure 1, a critic who favours w2 over w∞  when 
the cumulative density function is F(.) and the budgetary outlay is B, may continue to 
endorse w2 when the cumulative density function shifts downward to G(.) through 
investment in rural infrastructure, and the potential employment curve moves outward 
through an increase in the budget size from B to B′: but notice from Figure 1 that w2 
under the new dispensation is precisely the wage (Basu’s prescription!) yielded by the 
intersection of the (new) supply and potential employment curves. To put it differently, 
it is possible for one—without being guilty of ethical inconsistency—to appear to be 
minimizing poverty as measured (say) by the index P2 under one set of circumstances, 11 
 
and by the index Pα  →  ∞  under a different set. Hence the difficulty of inferring a person’s 
‘ethical orientation’ from an allegedly ‘revealed’ preference over poverty indices. 
To summarize: (a) a choice of (T,w) which is dictated by minimization of Pα  →  ∞  would 
be regarded as the uniquely ethical outcome only if lexical priority is accorded to the 
value of equity; (b) if tradeoffs with other values are permitted, then ethically 
rationalizable choices of (T,w) could diverge from (T
∞ ,w∞ ); (c) it may be empirically 
erroneous to causally associate choices of (T,w) with deliberate minimization of some 
well-defined poverty index; and (d) it may be normatively erroneous to deduce an 
unconditional (‘revealed’) preference in the space of poverty measures from data on 
preferences in (T,w) space. 
5.2 Self-selection   
The second argument in favour of the low wage of w∞  is linked to the self-selection 
feature of this wage-setting formula; as Basu (1991: 367) puts it: ‘[w∞ ] has another 
advantage. It sharpens the self-selection property of FFW since…, as [the wage] 
becomes smaller, the wealthier (in terms of labour income) will be less inclined to come 
for FFW jobs, thereby paving the way for the poor to take these up’. This, of course, is 
true, but the policymaker needs to know what the wage w∞  is before its self-selection 
property can be exploited. The question therefore arises of what information the planner 
requires, at a minimum, in order to identify the wage w∞ . It would appear that a 
necessary item of information is the shape of the cumulative density function F(.). 
While it is one thing to know that w∞  is determined by the intersection of the labour 
supply (or F(w)) curve and the employment potential (or M(w)) curve, the ‘actual 
execution of this’, as Basu (1991: 366) says, ‘may not be as easy as it appears. In 
Afghanistan, wages were set so low, in an effort to maximize the spread, that the 
projects were perennially short of labour. In Lesotho the wage was set so high that 
landowners were quitting working on their own land to work at FFW sites’. Briefly, in 
order to implement the w∞   solution, the planning agency must be assumed to have 
knowledge of the income distribution (though not, of course, knowledge of who has 
what income). 
With knowledge of the shape of the F(.) function, it may appear that the ‘sharpened self-
selection’ property is exclusively a feature of the w∞  wage solution. For, if the objective 
is to implement, say, the w2 wage, then note that the optimal (P2-minimizing) coverage 
is constituted by the poorest F(x2) proportion of the population; however, the potential 
suppliers of labour at a wage of w2 are constituted by the poorest F(w2) proportion of 
the population, and (see Figure 1) since F(.) is a monotically increasing function and 
w2 > x2, F(w2) > F(x2). So the question arises as to how, in the presence of this excess 
supply, one can confine the wage employment programme to the target population 
T2  ≡  [0,x2] when one only has knowledge of the shape of the cumulative density 
function but not of who has what income. This, presumably, is the second, instrumental 
(or ‘sharpened self-selection’) argument in favour of the Basu (w∞ ) wage solution. 
In principle, however, the planning agency can implement the w2 wage solution by 
making a wage policy announcement which is ‘incentive compatible’. To see what is 
involved, let us employ h2* as a shorthand for B/w2. Let h2 stand for the actual labour 
supply when the wage rate is w2. (Of course, h2 = F(w2)). The agency could now make 12 
 
the following wage policy announcement, call it Announcement W: ‘The wage on offer 
will be w2, provided h2 does not exceed h2*; if h2 does exceed h2*, then the wage on 
offer will drop to x2’. Every person with income x∈ T2 ≡  [0,x2) may be expected to 
reason as follows: ‘the wage on offer, even under the worst circumstances, is x2, which 
compares favourably with my reservation wage, so it is worthwhile for me to 
participate’. Every person with income x∈ [0,w2)\T2
  may be expected to reason as 
follows: ‘Clearly, each person with income x∈ T2 will participate. If I, too, decide to 
participate, then h2  will exceed h2*, and the wage on offer will be only x2—which 
compares unfavourably with my reservation wage. There would therefore be no point in 
my participating’. The net effect is to make Announcement W capable of implementing 
the P2-minimizing solution. The ‘instrumental’ justification for the low wage of w∞  is, 
therefore, arguably not uniquely relevant to the w∞  wage solution. 
6  A modified wage employment programme 
Anti-poverty wage employment programmes, in principle, are supposed to contribute to 
the creation of physical infrastructure and durable assets with a potential for generating 
benefit streams into the future. In practice, however, a great many of these schemes end 
up, as Basu (1981) puts it, in the creation of ‘roads that get washed away’ during the 
next monsoon. In effect, therefore, these ‘wage employment programmes’ are a 
disguised form of direct transfers with the advantage of a built-in self-selection feature 
in them. This advantage, however, is purchased at a cost: the wage component of an 
employment programme is not the only component of costs that needs to be reckoned. 
Ravallion (2001 [1990]; 287) points out that ‘the agency incurs an administrative cost 
… in addition to the benefit paid out. For example in a relief work scheme, this covers 
supervision and all materials and tools used…’ Citing evidence from India, Guhan 
(2001: 315-16) reports: ‘the nominal wage component in the total cost involved in 
creating a personday of employment was about 50 per cent in the late 1980s…’ He 
proceeds to list a number of generic drawbacks of employment schemes: 
The poor can derive indirect benefits from the assets created under the 
EGS [Employment Guarantee Scheme] but only on two conditions: the 
assets must be durable (not just roads that are washed away in the next 
rains) and they should be such as to benefit the poor (at least along with 
the non-poor). Available studies indicate that non-durable rather than 
more permanent works tend to be preferred for a variety of reasons: the 
dispersion of the works, the tendency to economize on materials in order 
to increase the wage content, and local political pressures. In many cases, 
works are abandoned incomplete and new ones started elsewhere: the 
maintenance is sorely neglected (Mahendra Dev 1992: 52-3). 
Furthermore, assets such as irrigation, soil conservation, and roads are 
likely, by their very nature, to benefit the landowning and trading non-
poor rather than those who have laboured to create them. … 
[Employment schemes also] leave out … the unemployable such as the 
old and the handicapped and do not have an urban equivalent (Guhan 
2001: 316-7). 
For all practical purposes, therefore, a wage employment programme could be a 
somewhat expensive form of direct income transfer: that is to say, if the wage on offer 13 
 
is w, then every person in the identified target population is enabled to avail himself of 
this ‘dole’, provided he foregoes his existing income which, specifically, will require 
him to be physically present at the work site for the duration of the day when he could 
be earning his income elsewhere. It would amount to more than a figure of speech to 
suggest that evaluations of actual performance on the ground indicate that the costs of 
an ‘employment’ programme might be significantly less if the beneficiary were required 
not to work but merely to twiddle his thumbs. However, it is neither attractive nor 
practicable to enclose human beings in a pen in order to secure the requisite measure of 
self-selection. Indeed, one way of exploiting the distinctive advantage of an 
employment scheme while mitigating some of its distinctive drawbacks as enumerated 
by Guhan, would be to reformulate it as an adult literacy programme. Specifically, if it 
is believed to be worthwhile to transfer a benefit of, say, w* to each individual in the 
poorest, say, h* proportion of the population, then presumably this can be achieved 
through a policy announcement of the type W considered toward the end of section 5. 
Only, the benefit of w* is now a compensation not for physical labour but for putting 
oneself through school. Savings on implements, tools and materials can be substantial; 
corrupt and inefficient works contractors can be by-passed; the old and the disabled 
need not be excluded from the ambit of programme benefits; a significant contribution 
to the creation of a capital asset—albeit social and human rather than physical—can be 
achieved; the stream of benefits from the acquisition of literacy can be ensured to accrue 
to the poor, with the added attraction of a large component of (particularly intra-
household) externality being generated by the literacy programme (on which see Basu 
and Foster 1998); and an adult literacy programme, unlike an employment scheme, can 
be replicated in the urban areas. 
7  Concluding observations  
In this paper we have quickly reviewed optimal anti-poverty budgetary rules, in the 
context of two kinds of intervention—direct income transfers and wage employment 
programmes—when poverty is measured by a spectrum of indices describing different 
degrees of distribution-sensitivity and belonging to the well-known Foster, Greer and 
Thorbecke (Pα ) family of measures. The two types of intervention have been compared 
in terms of cost effectiveness under conditions of both partial and complete information 
regarding the personal distribution of incomes. The case of employment programmes 
has been analysed with respect to both the ethical and (informationally) instrumental 
advantages which might be possessed by alternative optimal policies—corresponding to 
the minimization of alternative poverty measures—in the form of different wage-
coverage combinations. It has been argued that a ‘low wage-large coverage’ 
combination does not necessarily dominate, either from ethical or sharply-defined self-
selection considerations, other plausible ‘equity-conscious’ combinations. Finally, 
attention has been drawn to the possible advantages of reformulating a wage-
employment programme as an adult literacy programme, where the emphasis is on 
exploiting the principle of self-selection which is integral to employment schemes while 
avoiding some of their drawbacks. This paper has been largely in the nature of an 
analytical summary of a number of important debates in anti-poverty policy, with the 
objective less of presenting a set of revelatory results than of reviewing and clarifying a 
class of issues native to the literature. 14 
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